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Having experienced the worst ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis of the past decades, the international 
community embarked on an ambitious reform agenda to secure strong, sustainable and balanced growth 
in a post-crisis world. The most prominent issues on this agenda are the reform of ﬁ  nancial regulation and 
the problem of macroeconomic imbalances. With regard to regulatory reform, a major step has already 
been taken by drawing up the Basel III framework. Nevertheless, there are still unresolved issues, such 
as the detailed treatment of systemically important ﬁ  nancial institutions and an adequate approach to 
the shadow banking system.
Global macroeconomic imbalances have to be addressed because they not only reﬂ  ect underlying barriers 
to sustainable growth but, in themselves, pose a threat to stability. On a regional level, the euro area, 
while recording a balanced account vis-a-vis the rest of the world, is marked by divergencies between 
member states, which place a strain on the monetary union. In both cases, a sensible policy approach has 
to focus on structural reforms to address the underlying causes instead of just the symptoms. Therefore, 
direct interventions, such as the attempt to steer current accounts or exchange rates within speciﬁ  c target 
zones, are not advisable.
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W
hen the US housing market was showing 
increasing signs of stress in the summer of 
2007, few observers could have imagined 
what the ultimate fallout would be. Three and a half 
years later, we can look back on the worst ﬁ  nancial 
and economic crisis of the past few decades. Not 
only did the crisis cause enormous costs in terms 
of growth, employment and government budgets, 
it also challenged our economic models as well as 
the institutions and policies which are based on 
them. Furthermore, the crisis also revealed that 
the high growth rates of the global economy in the 
years prior to the crisis had been, at least to some 
extent, exaggerated and unsustainable. Therefore, 
policymakers throughout the world have made the 
commitment to prevent major crises like the one 
we have just witnessed from happening again and 
to secure stability and growth in a post-crisis world.
This goal is of paramount importance. But it is also 
ambitious and must not be allowed to overburden 
economic policy with expectations that are hard to 
fulﬁ  l: that is true not only because of the far-reaching 
and complex measures that have to be implemented 
as lessons to be learned from the crisis, but also 
given the often rather indirect impact of economic 
policy on macroeconomic outcomes in market-based 
economies and the role played by policy measures 
in the emergence of the crisis.
While economic growth is usually treated as a 
macroeconomic phenomenon, it can ultimately be 
traced back to microeconomic activities. It is this 
level which determines whether the resources that 
fuel the engine of growth are allocated in a way 
that maximises output and welfare. In this process, 
the ﬁ  nancial system plays an important role as it 
allocates investment capital, which is one of the main 
drivers of economic growth. Nevertheless, the crisis 
highlighted that the ﬁ  nancial system can also be a 
major source of instability. Consequently, we have to 
reform the ﬁ  nancial system so that it can once again 
become an efﬁ  cient and stable prerequisite for 
economic growth. The ways and means to achieve 
this objective are discussed in chapter 1.
A well-functioning ﬁ  nancial system is a necessary, 
but not sufficient precondition for sustainable 
growth. Consequently, the attempt to secure stability 
and growth has to focus on other aspects as well. 
Macroeconomic imbalances at the global level are 
a prominent issue in this connection. That is not to 
say that current account imbalances were one of the 
causes of the ﬁ  nancial crisis. The deﬁ  cient ﬁ  nancial 
system played a far greater role in this respect. 
Even so, the imbalances not only reﬂ  ect underlying 
barriers to sustainable growth but, in themselves, 
add an element of instability to the system. Thus, 
the problem of global imbalances and their causes 
has to be addressed so that the global economy can 
return to a more balanced and sustainable pattern 
of growth. This issue is discussed in the ﬁ  rst part of 
chapter 2.
Although the euro area as a whole has a roughly 
balanced current account vis-a-vis the rest of the 
world, signiﬁ  cant divergencies within the monetary 
union do exist. Just like the imbalances at the 
global level, they reﬂ  ect underlying distortions in 
individual member states. Given close integration 
within the euro area, the resulting developments 
can eventually have a serious effect on all member 
states, as was made all too clear by the sovereign debt 
crisis. Therefore, the problem of macroeconomic 
imbalances within the euro area has to be addressed 
in Europe’s own interest as well. This issue will be 
discussed in the latter part of chapter 2.
1| T HE REFORM OF THE GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
As stated above, a well-functioning financial 
system is an important prerequisite for economic 
growth. At the same time, the crisis has shown that 
shortcomings within the ﬁ  nancial system can also 
be a major source of instability. Consequently, any 
attempt to secure stability and growth in a post-crisis 
world must begin with a reform of the global ﬁ  nancial 
system. In this context, it is essential that the reforms 
are not just guided by the lessons of the current crisis, 
since the next one might emerge from a completely 
different angle. Acknowledging both this and the 
need for a global approach, the G20 has drawn up 
a comprehensive plan to reform ﬁ  nancial regulation. 
The general objective is to make the ﬁ  nancial system 
as a whole more resilient to potential shocks.
The natural starting point for such a reform was the 
existing global rulebook known as Basel II. After 
implementing some ad hoc adjustments in July 2009, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
proposed far-reaching reforms in December 2009. 
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In effect, these reforms were so sweeping that 
Basel II was to become Basel III. By requiring banks 
to hold more capital of better quality and to build up 
adequate liquidity buffers, the new rules will make 
individual banks more stable and will constitute 
a ﬁ  rst line of defence against systemic crises. Now 
that the rules have been endorsed at the G20 Summit 
in Seoul, they should be transposed into national 
law and applied without falling behind the agreed 
timetable.
However, failure of individual institutions can never 
be entirely ruled out. Thus, a second line of defence 
is needed to prevent the failure of individual banks 
from triggering a systemic crisis. Systemically 
important institutions (SIFIs) are a special issue 
in this context, that is banks which are so big or 
so interconnected that their failure might provoke 
a chain reaction which could eventually lead to a 
systemic crisis. Thus, SIFIs have an incentive to 
engage in risk-prone behaviour and gamble on 
being bailed out whenever they get into trouble. 
Consequently, regulation has to be designed to 
counter such moral hazard behaviour. An initial 
step could be to introduce a capital surcharge as 
well as more intensive supervision for SIFIs in order 
to enhance their stability. However, since failure 
still cannot be ruled out entirely, minimising moral 
hazard ultimately requires a system that allows 
for an orderly restructuring of SIFIs. Only then 
will it be possible to credibly bail-in investors and 
thus impose the necessary market discipline on 
SIFIs. With regard to international regulation, only 
globally active institutions should be addressed 
by an international SIFI regime. A pragmatic 
approach would be to start with a limited number of 
institutions which are indisputably of global systemic 
relevance. In the meantime, it would be necessary 
to develop a methodology for identifying SIFIs by 
applying the criteria of size, interconnectedness and 
substitutability, supplemented by judgement.
Nevertheless, the crisis demonstrated that systemic 
risks not only emanate from SIFIs but also emerge 
from outside the regular banking system. Prior 
to the crisis, bank managers had moved risky 
activities out of the regular banking system in order 
to circumvent regulation. As a result, a shadow 
banking system emerged where institutions such 
as special-purpose vehicles operated outside the 
realm of ﬁ  nancial regulation. As these institutions 
replicated the general functions of banks, such as 
maturity transformation, huge risks built up in an 
uncontrolled way. Regulatory reform must not allow 
this process to resume, especially given that tighter 
reins for the regular banking system might squeeze 
even more activities out of it and into the shadow 
banking system. Therefore, it is important to increase 
transparency requirements for the shadow banking 
system and, where necessary, extend supervision and 
regulation beyond the regular banking sector. The 
guiding principle behind this should be that similar 
activities have to be regulated in a similar way, no 
matter who pursues them.
With regard to these loose ends of regulatory reform, 
it is important that momentum is not lost once 
the Basel III framework is in place. Further effort 
and international cooperation are required for the 
eventual creation of a ﬁ  nancial system that is stable 
and efﬁ  cient enough to serve the real economy 
and thus secure a sound foundation for sustainable 
growth. Nonetheless, a well functioning ﬁ  nancial 
system is only one necessary condition for strong, 
sustainable and balanced economic growth. The 
global attempt to secure growth and stability has to 
focus on other aspects, too. At the moment, global 
imbalances are the most prominent among these.
2| M ACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES 
AS A PROBLEM FOR STABILITY 
AND GROWTH
2|1  The global level
Over the past several decades, the economies of the 
world have become increasingly integrated. With 
the removal of barriers to the worldwide ﬂ  ow of 
ideas, services, goods and capital, a global economy 
emerged. This has brought about a large increase 
in welfare and still harbours a huge potential for 
further economic growth and prosperity. During 
the past years, growth in the world economy has 
become increasingly unbalanced, however. Whereas 
the current account of the euro area has been more 
or less balanced in the past, some economies, most 
notably the United States, have been posting large 
and persistent current account deficits. Others, 
such as China and the oil-exporting countries, have 
been reporting equally persistent current account 
surpluses. In 2006, the US current account deﬁ  cit 
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peaked at 6% of gross domestic product (GDP). 
The Chinese surplus reached 10.6% of GDP in 2007. 
In the wake of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, these imbalances have 
narrowed to a certain extent. In 2009, the US current 
account deﬁ  cit was down to 2.7% of GDP; the Chinese 
surplus had decreased to 6% of GDP. However, this 
reduction in current account imbalances has been due 
in part to cyclical factors, such as a steep decline in 
oil prices. Current account positions may therefore 
be expected to diverge again. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the US deﬁ  cit 
will reach 3.3% of GDP in 2015; for the same year, the 
Chinese surplus is estimated to reach 7.8% of GDP.1
In principle, a current account surplus or deﬁ  cit is 
not a problem in itself. Technically, it reﬂ  ects the 
difference between –public or private– domestic 
saving and investment. Countries that save more 
than they invest domestically run current account 
surpluses. Countries that invest more than they save 
have to borrow abroad and record current account 
deﬁ  cits. And, as for individuals, there is no reason 
why an economy as a whole should not be a net saver 
or borrower, even for an extended period of time. For 
countries with an ageing population it is a matter of 
rationality to save more than to invest domestically, 
since the number of investment projects with good 
prospects is declining, whereas households want 
to maintain their level of consumption in old age. 
Similarly, countries that export an exhaustible 
resource would be well advised to invest some of 
the proceeds abroad so that future generations 
can beneﬁ  t from the resources as well. Therefore, 
these countries have temporary current account 
surpluses and build up net foreign assets. At the same 
time, countries that are catching up on economic 
development usually invest more than they save, 
as they have ample investment opportunities but 
are usually short of capital. As a consequence, they 
have to borrow abroad and run temporary current 
account deﬁ  cits. By allowing economies to separate 
domestic absorption from output, current account 
imbalances are welfare-enhancing since consumption 
is smoothed over time and capital ﬂ  ows to those 
economies that offer the highest return.
However, current account imbalances are less benign 
when they are caused by distortions. In that case, 
they merely reﬂ  ect underlying barriers to sustainable 
growth while adding an element of instability to 
the global economy. The imbalances we observe 
today began to develop in the mid-1990s. Until the 
turn of the century, they were driven mainly by 
differences in perceived proﬁ  tability. Investment in 
the United States increased due to the hi-tech boom 
and an expected increase in productivity. At the same 
time, investment in some Asian countries declined 
as a result of the Asian crisis and the recession 
in Japan. The outcome of this was that current 
account divergencies between these countries 
and the United States increased. From 2001, the 
picture changed, which indicates that unsustainable 
developments were exercising a growing inﬂ  uence.
The widening US current account deﬁ  cit, for example, 
was increasingly a reﬂ  ection of a general decline in 
saving. Despite an ageing population and foreseeable 
increases in health and age-related expenditures, 
public saving deteriorated. Moreover, US household 
savings declined due to increased borrowing against 
rising house values. In the years prior to the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, a general boom in asset prices became 
another key factor leading to low saving rates. The 
counterpart to the US current account deﬁ  cits were 
surpluses in emerging markets, most notably China 
and some oil-exporting countries. For the latter group 
of countries, the surpluses can partly be explained 
by an increase in oil prices. Nevertheless, current 
account surpluses were also caused by the fact that 
some countries pursued exchange rate policies to 
artiﬁ  cially support their export sectors. The resulting 
revenues were, to a large extent, channelled back into 
the United States, leading to an accumulation of large 
foreign exchange reserves by the surplus countries. 
While this strategy might not appear to be irrational 
from the surplus country’s point of view, it is partly 
responsible for making the global economy more 
vulnerable to adverse shocks.
Altogether, the persistent large current account 
positions have too often not been the result of 
efﬁ  cient decisions to save or invest. Instead, they 
reﬂ  ect underlying barriers to growth and make the 
global economy vulnerable to shocks. In this sense, 
the term “imbalances” is justiﬁ  ed, and it is necessary 
to address them. However, when designing relevant 
measures, it is imperative not to underestimate the 
complexity of the problem. A country’s current 
account position is driven by a very diverse set 
of underlying factors from within and outside its 
1  See IMF (2010), World Economic Outlook, October 2010, pp. 195-197.
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borders. Consequently, any sensible approach to 
reducing current account imbalances should not 
aim at steering them directly. Instead, the objective 
should be to create circumstances in which current 
account positions are determined by efﬁ  cient and 
unbiased market decisions. In this context, it is 
important to recognise that the statistical symmetry 
of current account deﬁ  cits and surpluses does not 
necessarily reﬂ  ect a symmetry in the reasons for 
imbalances. Hence, the question of which countries 
have to act in correcting the global imbalances can 
be answered only by identifying the ultimate causes 
of these imbalances.
In general, emerging economies with current account 
surpluses as well as oil-exporting countries should 
remove any structural distortions that limit the 
expansion of domestic demand. In countries with 
an undervalued currency, for example, more ﬂ  exible 
exchange rates would strengthen purchasing power 
and thus help to redirect growth from exports to 
domestic demand. This, however, is not a panacea 
and should be supplemented by structural reforms. 
In China, for example, such reforms might include 
measures to improve social security, which 
would reduce precautionary household saving, 
strengthen domestic demand and ultimately lead 
to a more balanced current account. Economies 
with current account deﬁ  cits, on the other hand, 
should adopt measures to support private saving, 
reduce public deﬁ  cits and stabilise their debt ratios. 
Moreover, measures to strengthen export sectors, 
while maintaining open markets, would also help 
to reduce current account deﬁ  cits. To the extent 
that growth before the crisis persistently exceeded 
potential output growth, sizeable declines in domestic 
absorption are inevitable –the income levels and 
growth rates prevailing before the crisis are no longer 
the appropriate benchmark. In the end, there is no 
single remedy for the problem of global imbalances. 
Hence, it is important to address the underlying 
causes and allow market forces to rebalance the 
global economy.
The need to address the problem of global imbalances 
was recognised early on. An agreement on measures 
to reduce global imbalances was struck as long ago 
as 2006 by the International Monetary and Financial 
Committee of the IMF. This concerned, in particular, 
the United States as the main deﬁ  cit country as well 
as the main surplus countries in Asia and among the 
oil-exporting nations. While the United States pledged 
to increase domestic private saving and to consolidate 
the federal budget, the Asian emerging economies 
committed themselves to strengthening domestic 
demand and to allowing for greater ﬂ  exibility of 
exchange rates. Progress in implementing the agreed 
measures proved to be rather slow, however.
Another attempt to address the problem of 
imbalances on a political level was undertaken by 
the G20. The “Framework for strong, sustainable and 
balanced growth” was launched in September 2009. 
This framework includes a pledge to “promote more 
balanced current accounts”. As a general objective, 
this certainly points in the right direction. However, it 
is essential to address the problem of imbalances on 
a structural level. As has been argued above, current 
accounts reﬂ  ect a very complex set of determinants. 
Thus, any attempt to steer them directly within more 
or less arbitrary limits would overburden the relevant 
authorities. Similar objections apply to attempts to 
stabilise major exchange rates around given target 
values. Such efforts at macroeconomic ﬁ  ne-tuning 
raise public expectations that economic policy cannot 
live up to; rather, they risk creating new frictions that 
require further interventions.
With this caveat in mind, the framework could 
indeed usefully support the process of restoring 
more balanced global growth. In contrast to the 
multilateral consultations that were held in 2006, 
the G20 commitments are backed by all the major 
stakeholders and are driven at the highest level by the 
G20 leaders. Moreover, a Mutual Assessment Process 
forms part of the framework. This process could 
provide an opportunity for exerting peer pressure 
among members to undertake the required structural 
reforms. In the end, however, it is up to the national 
authorities to implement the necessary measures to 
allow for a market-based reduction of imbalances.
2|2  The European level
Divergencies within the euro area have existed since 
the beginning of monetary union. It was, however, 
the ﬁ  nancial crisis that brought them to the top of the 
agenda. Countries such as Germany or the Netherlands 
have been posting persistent current account surpluses, 
while countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain or 
Ireland have posted persistent current account deﬁ  cits. 
Again, such phenomena are not a problem per se. 
Rather, it depends on what the capital ﬂ  ows are used for.
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In the euro area, these capital ﬂ  ows were increased 
by the introduction of the euro. There were two 
reasons for this. First, exchange rate risk was 
eliminated, making cross-border investments less 
risky. Second, the risks of sovereign default were 
perceived to be converging towards a relatively 
low level. This in itself might have set the wrong 
incentives for investors, but the main problem was 
that the deﬁ  cit countries did not always invest the 
inﬂ  owing capital efﬁ  ciently. In Ireland and Spain, 
capital went mainly into booming but, ultimately, 
unsustainably dynamic real estate markets. In Greece, 
it funded high government deﬁ  cits, and in Portugal 
it supported private consumption. This allocation 
boosted domestic demand and, owing to inﬂ  exible 
labour markets, wages rose faster than productivity. 
This, in turn, reduced the price competitiveness of 
the deﬁ  cit countries –imports increased, exports 
dwindled and the current account deﬁ  cit widened 
further. In a monetary union, an important corollary 
of the common monetary policy is national economic 
policymakers’ increased responsibility for coping 
with idiosyncratic shocks. Failure to acknowledge 
this fundamental relationship was at the root of the 
divergencies we observed.
Although these imbalances are domestic in origin, the 
associated problems have not been conﬁ  ned to the 
national level. Given spillover effects in the closely 
integrated euro-area ﬁ  nancial markets, the imbalances 
have also become a problem for other member states 
and for the monetary union as a whole, culminating in 
the debt crisis that began in 2010. As a result, it became 
obvious that the existing imbalances within the euro 
area had to be dealt with if major harm to the monetary 
union were to be avoided.
As the deeper causes of the imbalances are domestic 
factors within the deﬁ  cit countries, it is mainly 
incumbent on them to take action. A number 
of structural reforms are necessary to enhance 
the competitiveness of domestic companies by 
increasing productivity and keeping costs in check. 
At the same time, the deﬁ  cit countries have to 
increase labour market ﬂ  exibility and consolidate 
government budgets. In this context, a much-debated 
question is whether surplus countries should adjust, 
too. On a rather general level of abstraction, they 
certainly have to. Once import demand from deﬁ  cit 
countries declines, surplus countries will have 
to reallocate some resources towards satisfying 
domestic demand.
Even though structural reforms in surplus countries 
can facilitate this process, such reforms are beneﬁ  cial 
in themselves, quite apart from the question of 
macroeconomic divergencies within the euro 
area: Germany, for example, would always beneﬁ  t 
from more ﬂ  exible labour markets, which reduce 
low-skilled unemployment, and from deregulated 
services and product markets. Germany is also a case 
in point with regard to the beneﬁ  ts of comprehensive 
and, sometimes, painful structural reforms. The 
dividend from this was a robust labour market during 
the recent downturn, which meant comparatively 
robust private consumption, while the signiﬁ  cantly 
improved state of public finances had a major 
stabilising role in Germany as well as in the euro 
area as a whole. The unemployment rate has now 
gone back down below its pre-crisis level, economic 
growth is increasingly being driven by domestic 
demand, and the government is beneﬁ  ting from 
high market conﬁ  dence in the soundness of public 
ﬁ  nances through low reﬁ  nancing costs.
This has led to calls to use the supposedly larger 
available room for manoeuvre to actively boost 
domestic demand. However, this would do little to 
ease the adjustment burdens of deﬁ  cit countries: 
since trade ﬂ  ows are highly diversiﬁ  ed, an increase 
in the imports of surplus countries would improve 
the current account in deﬁ  cit countries only by a 
small margin. Given the current trade structure, 
a 10% increase in German imports would improve 
the current account balance in Spain, Portugal and 
Greece by a mere 0.25 percentage point. In Ireland, 
the current account would improve by 1 percentage 
point.2 Furthermore, the options for actively boosting 
demand are themselves very limited. Raising wages to 
support domestic demand and lower competitiveness 
is hardly possible as wages are not a political control 
variable. Moreover, simulation studies show that the 
effects would be conﬁ  ned almost entirely to the home 
economy in the form of changes in employment. Also, 
the options for using ﬁ  scal policy to stimulate domestic 
demand and imports should not be overstated: public 
ﬁ  nances in surplus countries are also strained, and 
ambitious consolidation efforts are required there as 
well. Consequently, it is inevitable that most of the 
burden of adjustment will fall on the deﬁ  cit countries.
2  See Bundesbank (2010): “On the problems of macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area”. In: Bundesbank Monthly Report, July 2010, pp. 17-38.
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In addition, calls for expansionary macroeconomic 
policies in surplus economies are hard to reconcile 
with the goal of balanced and sustainable growth. 
Given the limited spillover to deﬁ  cit countries, 
additional stimulus measures in surplus economies 
already undergoing a brisk recovery would be highly 
procyclical, thereby increasing heterogeneity within 
the euro area and forcing monetary policymakers 
to take a more restrictive stance in order to ensure 
price stability.
The ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis has shown that a global effort is required to prevent future crises of 
a similar magnitude. This has been acknowledged by governments around the world, and the G20 has 
emerged as the main forum for discussing relevant measures on a global level. The undisputed objective 
is to secure stability and growth in a post-crisis world, and, accordingly, the G20 has developed an 
encompassing agenda for reform. Two of the main issues in this context have been discussed in this 
article –the reform of ﬁ  nancial regulation and the problem of macroeconomic imbalances.
However, in the face of this ambitious work programme, it is important to have a clear understanding of 
what economic policy can and cannot achieve. It is certainly necessary to strengthen institutions, such as 
the regulatory framework for ﬁ  nancial markets. It is also necessary to remove structural barriers to strong, 
sustainable and balanced economic growth, such as rigidities on product and labour markets, managed 
exchange rates which are out of line with fundamentals, and unsustainable public ﬁ  nances. However, 
economic policy and policymakers cannot directly make growth strong, sustainable and balanced, and they 
should not strive to do so. One reason for this is that the ﬁ  nancial crisis was not caused solely by market 
participants’ behaviour; economic policy also has to take its share of the blame. A more fundamental 
reason is that the market economies are far too complex to be micromanaged by governments. Therefore, 
“more government and less market” cannot be the solution. Rather, it should be “better government for 
better market outcomes”. In terms of policymaking, the only way to achieve this is by creating a strong 
institutional framework in which market forces can act to efﬁ  ciently rebalance the global economy and 
generate sustainable growth.
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